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Taxonomic Mental Models in
Competitor Definition
ABSTRACT
In this paper, we outline a cognitive approach to the
problem of competitor definition. The paper begins with a
discussion of the information processing demands implied by
current models of competitive strategy. We then discuss how
decision-makers simplify the competitive environment by using a
mental model of competitive groups. The paper ends with a
discussion of the implications of a cognitive approach for the
classification of organizations and organizational adaptation.

Although competition among organizations has historically
been considered an important determinant of organizational
performance (e.g., Scherer, 1980), the topic has received renewed
attention with the development of ecological approaches to
organization-environment relations (e.g., Aldrich, 1979; Hannan &
Freeman, 1977), substantive models of competitive strategy (e.g.,
Porter, 1980), and pragmatic concerns about industrial
competitiveness in a global economy (e.g., Teece, 1987).
Theoretical treatments of rivalry have typically taken an
environmental perspective by viewing competitive
interdependencies as external pressures on the actions and
outcomes of individual organizations. However, most theorists
have recognized that organizations can and do exercise some
degree of strategic choice in adapting to competitive pressures.
This is true, for example, of game theory (e.g., Shubik, 1959)
resource dependency theory (e.g., Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), and
contingency theory (e.g., Khandwalla, 1981). Business strategy
scholars have perhaps been most explicit in this regard by
arguing that an important role is played in competitive dynamics
by key decision-makers who monitor rival organizations and
formulate strategies to achieve competitive success (e.g.,
Porter, 1980; Rumelt, 1987).
To the extent that decision-makers have a role in an
organization's responses to rivalry, it becomes necessary to
inquire about the social psychological factors influencing how
decision-makers frame competitive environments and understand the
nature of competitive threats. This follows from recent
cognitive approaches to the study of organization-environment
relations (e.g., Daft & Weick, 1984; Dutton & Jackson, 1987;
J
Kiesler & Sproull, 1982; Smircich & Stubbart, 1985). Daft and
Weick (1984), for example, have argued that strategic decisions
are driven by cognitive structures that label and make sense of
environmental occurrences. Prom a cognitive perspective,
decision-makers act upon a mental model of the environment.
Thus, any explanation for strategic responses to competitive
pressures must ultimately consider the mental models of
competitive strategists. Unfortunately, the tendency to view
competition as an environmental phenomenon involving primarily
economic contingencies has resulted in the psychology of the
competitive strategist either being completely ignored or assumed
away by the axioms of existing theory. Consequently, as Weitz
(1985) has noted, very little is known about the socio-cognitive
underside of competitive interactions, and virtually no theory
exists to explain how strategists make sense of competitive
environments
.
We attack this deficiency in the present paper by setting^
out a framework to resolve perhaps the most fundamental problem
in competitive sensemaking: competitor definition. Porters
(1980) has argued that a viable competitive strategy is dependent
upon decision-makers understanding the goals, strategies,
capabilities, and assumptions of rivals. However, before this
5understanding is possible, and thus before competitive strategies
can be formulated, decision-makers must have an image of who
their rivals are and on what dimensions they compete. Given the
diverse range of organizational forms, and the fact that
decision-makers possess only a limited capacity to process
complex flows of interorganizational cues, the task of defining
"the competition" is non-trivial and problematic. In this paper,
we will first outline the cognitive dilemma faced by decision-
makers when formulating competitive strategies, and then propose
that this dilemma leads to the use of simplifying mental models
to define rivals. To the extent that the two can be separated
conceptually, our focus is primarily upon the structure of these
mental models rather than upon the process of competitive
identification per se. The paper draws heavily from recent
research in cognitive science, and ends with a discussion of the
implications of our approach for such topics as organizational
classification, organizational adaptation, and cognitive
assessment
.
INTERORGANIZATIONAL COMPARISONS AND COMPETITOR DEFINITION
According to current ecological models, organizations
compete with one another to the extent that they are similar in
form and require similar resources to survive (e.g., Aldrich,
1979; Hannan & Freeman, 1977). Organizational form has been
defined as the configuration of attributes determining an
organization's resource demands (McKelvey, 1982). Two
organizations are similar if they share important attributes and
hence tap the same resource flows within the task environment . ft
Since critical resources are usually scarce, similar
organizations are often competitively interdependent in that the A
resource acquisitions of one organization detract from the
resource acquisitions of the others. Competitive interdependence
implies that an organization's survival is a function of it's
resource capabilities relative to existing rivals. In Aldrich's
(1979) terms, "Selection occurs through relative rather than
absolute superiority in acquiring resources, and an effective
organization is one that has achieved a relatively better
position in an environment it shares with others, rather than the
hypothetical 'best' position" (p. 30).
Thus, to the extent that strategic choice is involved in
competitive interactions, the goal of competitive strategy is to
manipulate organizational attributes (e.g., inputs, outputs,
size, administrative structure, technologies, skills, etc.) in
such a way as to achieve a superior position relative to rival
organizations— in Porter's (1980) terms, to maximize the value of
capabilities distinguishing the organization from it's
competitors (p. 47). In solving this problem, strategists must Q
inevitably consider the attributes of other organizations. On
the one hand, strong pressures exist to imitate organizational
forms that have been successful in exploiting a resource niche
(e.g., Aldrich, McKelvey & Ulrich, 1984; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983;
Hannan & Freeman, 1977). On the other hand, superiority in the
7acquisition of resources comes from creating and sustaining
attributes that are not easily imitated (e.g.
, Porter, 1980;
Rumelt, 1984) . The dual pressure to both imitate and
differentiate means that one important interpretive
responsibility of the strategist is to scan the environment,
assess an organization's attribute similarity vis-a-vis others,
and formulate plans to create that specific attribute
configuration which balances similarities and differences in a
profitable way (Aldrich et al., 1984).
Here lies the interpretive problem of competitor definition.
A complete assessment of an organization's strengths and
weaknesses would entail comparing all the attributes of the focal
organization with all known attributes of all other
organizations. Given imperfections in the flow of information
about other organizations (even elaborate competitor intelligence
systems have their flaws) , as well as cognitive limitations on
the part of the strategist, a complete assessment is impossible.
The strategist is thus faced with a definitional problem. Should
all, some, or no other organizations be considered competitive
reference points? How is a balance achieved between maximizing
the use of all information about an organization's competitive
strengths and weaknesses, and simplifying environmental scanning
and competitive monitoring?
Historically, this problem has been delt with by economists
who have specified a priori criteria for classifying
organizations into competitive groups. Two different criteria
8have received the most attention (e.g., Scherer, 1980).
According to the "industry" criterion, organizations compete with,
one another when they share similar technological attributes and
can produce similar outputs. Thus, for example, twoi
organizations capable of manufacturing steel might be defined as
members of the "steel industry" and be considered competitors
because of the overlapping technological attributes their steel
production would necessitate. Alternatively, the "market"
criterion suggests that organizations compete with one another
when their output attributes fulfill similar client functions and
are thus substi tutable . Thus, for example, an organization
manufacturing plastic auto components might be considered in the
same competitive group (e.g., the "auto components market") as an
organization producing metal parts because both types of outputs
satisfy a demand for automotive products.
Defining competitors in this fashion simplifies the
interorganizational comparison process considerably. However,
such derived classifications are unsatisfactory as cognitive
accounts for how decision-makers solve the comparison dilemma in
practice for a number of reasons. First, there is no reason to
assume that managers use the same criteria as researchers when |
ascertaining competitors. Walton (1986), for example, found that
one attribute mentioned by managers as discriminating among/
organizational forms was size, a characteristic not easily
assimilated into either industry or market segmentations.
Second, both industry and market criteria are themselves somewhat
ambiguous. Nightengale (1978), for example, has argued that
industry classifications often lead to somewhat arbitrary
groupings, and Robinson (1956) once argued that "A precise and
meaningful definition of an industry is a vain objective" (p.
361). Similar arguments against the economic market criterion
have also been put forth (e.g., Day, Shocker, & Srivastava,
1979). Finally, and most importantly, both criteria beg the
question of limiting interorganizational comparisons since
information about technological similarities and product
substitutabilities is often incomplete (Day et al
.
, 1979).
Because of imperfect information, industry and market
segmentations are as much inference as fact, and neither
criterion truly explains how decision-makers construct such
segmentations to define competitors and engage in competitive
scanning.
The logic of classifying organizations into competitive
groups is not, however, necessarily wrong. Indeed, as McGee and
Thomas (1986) point out, rigorous classifications can help to
uncover important behavioral differences among clusters of
organizations. However, a search for the cognitive underpinnings
of competitive strategy must deal not with the groupings of
industrial researchers, but with the cognitive models constructed
by decision-makers to make sense of the competitive environment.
We suggest that such models consist of internalized "cognitive
taxonomies" of organizational forms which describe organizational
similarities and differences. By using such taxonomies,
10
decision-makers define the form of their own organizations via
comparisons with known organizational types. On the basis of '
these comparisons, competitive definitions are constructed and
used during the the process of strategy formulation. In a sense,
(
then, we are suggesting that decision-makers act as
"organizational taxonomists" attempting to define competitors by
sorting through the complexities of organizational forms in the
environment. How cognitive taxonomies of organizational forms
are used to understand the competitive environment is the topic
of the next section.
USING COGNITIVE TAXONOMIES TO MAKE SENSE OP ORGANIZATIONAL
DIVERSITY AND DEFINE THE COMPETITION
Some General Principles of Cognitive Categorization
Two issues are important when considering the cognitive
classification of organizational forms. First, one must describe
how decision-makers group individual organizations into more
abstract cognitive categories. If "cognitive category" is
defined as a collection of organizations that are perceived as
similar to each other and different from those outside the
category, this issue reduces to understanding the rules!
transposing similarity judgments into abstract organizational
groups. Second, one must describe how such categories, once (
formed, are related to one another within some overall cognitive
structure. Because they are fundamental to categorization in any
knowledge domain, these two questions have motivated considerable
11
psychological research. A general consensus about the way people
categorize aspects of the environment has emerged, and it is
useful to review the important findings before discussing how
managerial mental categories influence competitive
identification. Dutton and Jackson (1987) have similarly
reviewed categorization research in their work on the perception
of organizational threats and opportunities.
With respect to how categories are formed, theory and
research suggests that cognitive categories are developed from
perceived similarities and differences in the attributes of the
objects or events being classified (e.g., Rosch, 1978; Smith &
Medin, 1981; Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, & Thagard, 1986). Using
"retailing" firms as an example, a manager might form the named
category "discount clothing stores" by recognizing that certain
individual establishments have a number of attributes in common
such as "low overhead locations," "reduced sales staff," "limited
selection," "second-season designer clothes," and "low prices."
Some attributes (e.g., "second season designer clothes") might be
common only to "discount clothing stores." These attributes have
high informational value because they serve to distinguish a
"discounter" from other types of clothing retailers. Other
attributes (e.g., "low prices," "reduced sales staff") might be
present in other types of retailers, making such attributes less
informative as a basis for classifying businesses. This means
that a cognitive category such as "discount clothing stores" will
develop when there are sufficient attributes to distinguish such
12
organizations from other organizational forms known to exist.
Thus, cognitive categories can be considered "feature sets" I
of attributes which are perceived to be common to category
members. One important finding which has emerged froraj
psychological research is that cognitive categories are
"polythetic" and seem to possess graded or indefinite boundaries
(e.g., Rosch & Mervis, 1975). This means that no single
attribute is viewed as belonging to all members of a category,
and no member is perceived to possess all attributes. Instead,
members are perceived to vary in how typical they are of the
category. Rosch and Mervis (1975) found evidence suggesting that
the members of cognitive categories considered very typical are
those members sharing many attributes with other category
members. Rosch and Mervis labeled typical members "prototypes,"
and suggested that they represent the perceived central tendency
of the category. Thus, for example, an establishment selling
hamburgers would probably be considered less typical of the
category "restaurant" than an elegant establishment offering
French haute cuisine because the latter organization possesses
more attributes common to other types of "restaurants."
With respect to the relationship between cognitive I
categories, evidence suggests that categories, once developed,
often form a hierarchical "cognitive taxonomy." According to (
Rosch (1978), a cognitive taxonomy is
. . . a system by which categories are related to
one another by means of class inclusion. The greater
13
the inclusiveness of a category within a taxonomy, the
higher the level of abstraction. Each category within
a taxonomy is entirely included within one other
category (unless it is the highest level of the category)
but is not exhaustive of that more inclusive category (p.
30) .
In a cognitive taxonomy, the most specific (or terminal) level
consists of the objects, events, etc. being classified. These
are grouped into more abstract categories, which themselves form
categories of even greater abstraction until a "root node" is
established at the most general level of classification. The
logic of hierarchical cognitive structures has been discussed by
many cognitive theorists (e.g., Anderson, 1983; Collins &
Quillian, 1969; Rosch, 1978; Holland et . al . , 1986) who have
argued that such structures simplify the storage of information
about complex environments. Instead of storing all the
attributes defining each category at every level of abstraction,
specific categories can "inherit" the attributes of more general
categories and thus need include only those attributes which
distinguish them from other subcategories. Thus, for example,
knowing that an organization is a "restaurant" already implies
certain attributes common to most restaurants (e.g., "sells
food," etc.). The subcategory "fast food restaurants" need
include only those attributes which make this type of restaurant
different from other known types.
The existence of cognitive taxonomies has been confirmed in
14
both psychological and anthropological research. For example,
Kempton (1978) found that people organize their knowledge of I
common utensils with a taxonomic structure of five hierarchical
levels. The category "utensils" was named as the most general )
category, while specific categories such as "Chinese teacups"
were least inclusive. Adelson (1985) uncovered a three-level
cognitive taxonomy in assessing the conceptual knowledge of
computer programmers regarding "data structures" and "algorithms"
(see Figure 1). Berlin, Breedlove, and Raven (1974) found a
three-level taxonomy in the Tzeltal language for "oaks." The
prevalence of hierarchical cognitive structures has prompted some
researchers to claim that they are fundamental to human thinking
and understanding (e.g., Anderson, 1983; Schank, 1982).
Cognitive Taxonomies of Organizational Forms and the Links to
Competitor Definition
The cognitive theory described above provides a useful
framework for thinking about how decision-makers make sense of
organizational diversity and define competitors. By
internalizing a mental classification of organizational forms,
the strategist can simplify the interorganizational environment
by collapsing individual organizations into category types.
Interorganizational comparisons can thus be performed not on the
attributes of individual organizations, but on the typical
attributes of categories of organizational forms. In this way,
competitive scanning and boundary definition can occur at a more
abstract level, thereby reducing the complexity of the comparison
15
problem. We offer five propositions to clarify how this
simplification process is worked out in practice, and also
discuss certain important qualifications to a strictly
hierarchical view of competitor definition.
Proposition I : Decision-makers make sense of competitive
environments by developing cognitive taxonomies summarizing the
similarities and differences among organizations.
This is our most basic assertion, and follows directly from
the cognitive theory and research discussed above. In the course
of their transactions with the environment, decision-makers
encounter many organizations of varying characteristics.
Although all organizations are in some sense unique, Proposition
I suggests that strategists group organizations into a conceptual
scheme consisting of categories varying in abstractness . The
category formation process can occur via both "bottom-up" and
"top-down" inferences. With the former, organizational
categories are constructed from direct experience with actual
organizations. Alternatively, top-down category formation
results from the use of category labels available from such
sources as the business press, government documents, and general
cultural belief systems. In this case, mental categories are
formed in the absence of direct experience with organizations
included within the category boundary.
Direct evidence for Proposition I has been obtained in
16
recent studies by Walton (1986), Reger (1987), Hodgkinson and
Johnson (1987), and Porac, Thomas, and Baden-Fuller (1989). Both
Walton (1986) and Reger (1987) used the Repertory Grid technique
(Kelley, 1955) in having bank executives judge the similarities
and differences among various financial organizations.
Respondents tended to make their comparisons on the basis of such
attributes as location, geographic scope, target market,
organizational structure and size, growth strategies, and
management skills. Both studies found evidence that bank
executives distinguished between "downtown" and "suburban" bank
organizational forms.
Hodgkinson and Johnson (1987) and Porac et al . (1989)
explicitly asked managers of firms in the United Kingdom to list
categories and subcategories of organizations relevant to their
own businesses. In the former study, managers of organizations
in the "grocery" business articulated very rich taxonomic
cognitive structures. In the case of the owner of a chain of
food stores, for example, these resarchers elicited a four-level
cognitive structure starting at the general category "national
grocery industry" and progressing to specific types of
"specialist" grocers such as "provisions," "greengrocer," and
"meats." Similarly, Porac et al . (1989) elicited taxonomies from
managers of Scottish knitwear firms. One respondent (see Figure |
2), for example, produced a six-level taxonomy that consisted of
the general category "textiles" and progressed through such
categories as "knitwear," "fashion knitwear," and "fully-
17
fashioned knitwear," and ended with categories concerning the
specific fiber types (e.g., cashmere, wool, cotton, etc.) that
different firms emphasize in their "fully-fashioned" lines.
Two aspects of the above cognitive taxonomies should be
mentioned. First, greater taxonomic complexity will probably
exist in classifying those organizations most familiar to the
decision-maker. This is line with the suggestion of Dougherty
(1978) and Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, and Boyes-Braem (1976)
that expertise in an environmental domain produces finer
discriminations among elements. Thus, strategists will have more
elaborate cognitive taxonomies concerning those organizations
most often encountered in transactions with the environment.
Such complexity should be evident by more taxonomic levels, more
categories at any given level, and a richer base of category
attributes. For example, Hodgkinson and Johnson (1987) observed
that managers who came into daily contact with a wide range of
food retailers had a much more complex understanding of the
similarities and differences among grocery organizations than
managers who were isolated from frequent contact with the market.
Second, there is likely to be some question as to whether
all managerial representations of organizational forms are
hierarchically organized (Hodgkinson & Johnson, 1987). Evidence
and theory in this regard are inconclusive. There seems to be
little disagreement in the relevant literatures that a
fundamental property of the human mind is its ability to
inductively generate cognitive categories summarizing
18
similarities and differences among objects, events, people, and
conditions in the environment (e.g., Holland et al
.
, 1986). What A
is at issue is whether categorical information is taxonomically
organized. We have already noted that cognitive taxonomies have*
been found to be useful descriptions of empirical data in a
number of applications in computer science, psychology, and
anthropology. The above empirical examples from managerial
respondents are themselves evidence that individuals can provide
quite interpretable taxonomic structures when they are prompted
to do so with the appropriate question frames. Nevertheless, a
number of researchers have openly questioned the role of "pure"
hierarchical knowledge representations. At minimum, Anderson's
(1983) contention that categorical information is organized as a
"tangled hierarchy" complicates a straightforward taxonomic
approach by implying that conceptual categories can have multiple
superordinates linked together in network fashion. Indeed, it is
not quite clear whether a hierarchical approach to human
conceptual structure is any better in describing the relevant
data than a purely non-hierarchical network organization (e.g.,
Sanford, 1985). Hunn (1982) has argued that, at least in some
areas of folk classification, a conceptual structure consisting
of "core" and "periphery" categories fits the empirical data
better than does a strictly hierarchial description. Randall A
(1976) has been even more strident in his objections to a
taxonomic approach in suggesting that the well-formed hierarchies
characteristic of much of the anthropological evidence for
19
cognitive taxonomies are results of on-the-spot inferences by
respondents rather than deep-seated conceptual structures.
We prefer to view this issue in relatively mundane terms as
an empirical question. The assumption that managerial cognitive
categories are taxonomically organized is useful in explaining
certain aspects of competitor definition. However, it is probably
the case that conceptual organization has many forms, and that a
taxonomic structure may not describe all areas of managerial
knowledge. The surfaces of many events confronting the
managerial mind are often too unstable to understand in a rigidly
taxonomic fashion. Variations in expertise, interests, and
environmental characteristics insure that significant gaps will
exist in a manager's categorical knowledge about many things.
Unfortunately, research and theory on managerial cognitive
organization is much too undeveloped to clarify the nature of the
mental representation of managerial situations. Until more work
is done, we advocate extending a taxonomic analysis of conceptual
structure as far as it will go before becoming misleadingly
inappropriate
.
Proposition II : Decision-makers define their own organization by
matching Its salient attributes to the typical attributes of
perceived organizational categories .
Abell (1980) has argued that before an organization can
formulate a course of competitive strategy, it must have a
20
"concept" or definition of its own activities and goals,
Similarly, Porter (1980) suggested that organizations must
regularly ask such basic questions as "What type of business are
we in?" These arguments suggest that a primary function of a*
mental classification scheme is to provide the decision-maker
with the knowledge and nomenclature to answer basic questions of
organizational identity. This is consistent with Alpert and
Whetten (1985) who have argued that "Organizations define who
they are by creating or invoking classification schemes and
locating themselves within them" (p. 267). By placing the
organization within the context of a cognitive taxonomic system,
the decision-maker makes sense of the organization's activities
in relation to others within the environment.
Defining an organization in this way entails matching the
known attributes of the focal organization with the typical
attributes of organizational categories. The comparison can
occur within a backward-looking, contemporaneous, or forward-
looking time frame. Thus, for example, a restauranteur might
note that "We were a typical 'American-style steak house* but are
now more of a 'Continental restaurant'." Here, the taxonomic
sel f -definition compares past and present organizational d
attributes simultaneously with the typical attributes of common
restaurant types. As Porter (1980) suggested, organizational^
definitions can be stated in both descriptive (e.g., "We are a
'Continental restaurant 1 .") and purposive (e.g., "We want to be a
•Continental restaurant'.") form. In either case, the
21
strategist's implicit cognitive structures are being brought to
bear as sensemaking tools to provide a personally and culturally
reinforcing nomenclature for defining what the organization is or
wants to be.
In addition to cognitive categories of organizational forms,
this comparison process requires that strategists possess a
mental representation of their own organization's characteristics
and capabilities. Such a representation could be an
organizational analog to the "self schemas" uncovered by social
psychologists in personality research (e.g., Markus, 1977).
Although definitions of the term "schema" have varied in the
literature, most theorists assume that schemata represent
unitized cognitive structures consisting of concepts and
relations mapping particular informational domains (e.g.,
Anderson, 1980; Rumelhart , 1980). Markus (1977) extended the
schema notion to the self-concept by arguing that individuals
develop mental representations of their own essential personality
characteristics. Similarly, it is likely that managers have
relatively well-defined schemas identifying the essential
features of their own organizations.
Although little research has been done on managerial
organizational schemata, there is suggestive evidence in the
strategy literature. In studies by Hawes and Crittendon (1984),
Dess and Davis (1984), and Forabrun and Zajac (1987), managers
described their own organizations with attributes defined by
researchers from existing theories of strategy. For example, in
22
the Dess and Davis (1984) study, managers described their
business on such dimensions as "customer service," "manufacturing m
innovativeness, " "outside financing," "product range," "operating
efficiency," and so forth. In all of these studies, thei
resulting ratings formed meaningful non-random clusters
indicating systematic differences in the ratings of managers
across firms in the sample. The possible existence of
organizational schemata raises interesting questions regarding
the interorganizational comparison process. For example, when
managerial schemata are complex, interorganizational comparisons
and self-definitions might be more difficult than when such
schemata are simple. Empirical questions of this sort need to be
fleshed out more carefully in future research.
Proposition III ; The Batching of a focal organization and a
cognitive category takes place at intermediate levels of
generality In a decision-maker's cognitive taxonomy.
The fact that cognitive categories are hierarchically
organized suggests that any given organization can be matched to
inclusive categories at more than one level of generality. An J
"upscale men's clothing store" can simultaneously be labeled a
"men's clothing store," a "clothing store," and a "retailer." At J
what level of abstraction is the organization defined? Although
the specific level of definition could vary from circumstance to
circumstance, depending upon the sensemaking demands of the
23
situation, theory and evidence from cognitive science suggests
that one level of a cognitive taxonomy is more informative and
"basic" than others. Rosch et. al
. ,
(1976) have suggested that
"
. . . the basic level of abstraction in a taxonomy is the level
at which categories carry the most information, possess the
highest cue validity, and are thus most differentiated from each
other" (p. 383).
Data provided by Rosch et. al . and others (e.g., Murphy &
Smith, 1982; Adelson, 1985; Rifkin, 1985) suggest that this basic
level is usually of an intermediate level of generality. Very
abstract cognitive categories have too few attributes to be very
informative of environmental structures, and extremely specific
categories are often very overlapping, perhaps being different in
only one or two attributes. Rosch et al . , suggest that
intermediate cognitive categories usually are the categories
which are both rich enough to provide useful information and
distinct enough to be non-redundant. Thus, such categories act
as a conceptual center of gravity around which knowledge about
environmental entities is organized.
The existence of a basic taxonomic level in the cognitive
categorization of organizational forms should be apparent in a
number of ways. When asked to label organizations spontaneously,
decision-makers should use middle-level category names.
Moreover, middle-level category attributes should be the most
easily remembered and the most easily recalled. The salience of
such categories should lead decision-makers to use middle-level
24
categories and their attributes to match to the focal
organization, and thus the definition of the focal organizations
should occur at intermediate levels of cognitive abstraction.
Although situations could arise where strategists use category,
nomenclature of greater or lesser degrees of abstraction when
attempting to make sense of the interorganizational environment,
Proposition III argues that, other things being equal,
organizational definitions will tend to orient toward middle-
level category names.
Direct evidence supporting Proposition III has been obtained
in a recent study by Porac and Thomas (1988). In this study,
managers of "groceries" in a small midwestern U.S. town were
asked to name various types and subtypes of retail groceries in
the local area. A four-level taxonomy was identified, beginning
with the general category "retailers" and progressing through
"groceries," "convenience stores" and "supermarkets," and ending
with specific types of convenience stores ("selling gas" vs. "not
selling gas") and supermarkets ("warehouse" vs. "full-service").
In a second stage of the research, managers were asked to
classify spontaneously their own organization. The majority of
respondents used the two middle-level categories of
"supermarkets" and "convenience stores" as best fitting their
business
.
Proposition IV : Once the focal organization has been matched to
a particular category label, organizations within that category
25
will be considered stronger competitors than organizations not
included within that category.
This proposition links the cognitive categorization schemes
of strategists to the definition of competitive boundaries.
Proposition IV implies that organizations outside of the defined
set of rivals will be viewed as weaker competitors, will be
monitored less closely, and thus understood more poorly than
organizations included within the category. When combined with
Proposition III, this suggests that competitive boundaries and
competitive scanning are fairly narrowly focused, since category
boundaries at middle-levels of abstraction will be somewhat
specific. Indeed, this is precisely why cognitive classification
schemes are useful--they provide a summary of the broad
interorganizational environment that is reasonable enough to
allow decision-makers to restrict the scanning of potential
competitors to a cognitively tractable number of other
organizations. Once the focal set of rivals has been defined,
competitive strategies can be formulated to counter and/or defend
against the actions of this more restricted group. This argument
is consistent with recent theoretical discussions of
organizational adaptation. Aldrich, McKelvey, and Ulrich (1984),
for example, have argued that when well-formed populations of
organizations exist, adaptation occurs at the "micro-niche" level
by organizations adjusting to the actions of competitors
occupying the same resource positions. In such cases, adaptation
26
is less a revolutionary reconstruction of an organization's basic
attributes than it is a series of minor modifications designed to|
maintain a viable position vis-a-vis a small set of known rivals.
Indeed, Aldrich et al . (1984) define "competitive strategy" as|
the planning of such micro-adjustments to a narrowly defined
collection of other similar organizations.
The narrow focus of competitive boundaries and scanning has
been confirmed in studies by Gripsrud and Gronhaug (1985) and
Porac and Thomas (1988). In the former study, managers of
grocery stores in a small Norwegian town were interviewed and
asked to list as many "competitors" as they could think of.
According to Gripsrud and Gronhaug' s account, approximately 50
local firms could roughly be considered "groceries" and yet
ninety percent of the managerial respondents cited five or fewer
organizations as competitors. Porac and Thomas (1988) provided
managers of retailing stores in a small town with 52 different
categories of local retailers (e.g., "clothing stores," "grocery
stores," "book shops," etc.) and asked them both to place their
own business within a category and to rate the extent to which
each category was a competitor of their particular firm. For
almost all respondents, firms outside of the manager's ownl
business category were not considered competitors at all.
The category-based competitive definition implied by d
Proposition IV raises three issues concerning the link between
cognitive classifications and the definition of rival
organizations. First, a cognitive account is considerably
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broader than traditional market and industry criteria for
ascertaining competitors since the attributes defining the focal
category can be any number of perceived organizational
characteristics. Thus, markets, technological skills, size,
location, labor, capital asset structures and so on can all be
used as a basis for discriminating competitors from non-
competitors if such attributes are perceived to define the
category into which the strategist places the focal organization.
In this regard, data presented by Porac et al . (1989) reinforce
the fact that perceived competitive distinctions do not always
correspond to solely market or technological isomorphisms.
Studying Scottish knitwear manufacturers, Porac et al. found
evidence suggesting that attributes involving geographical (in or
near Scotland and thus possessing the "Scottish image"), market
(top 5* of wage earners in any given country), and technological
(ability to use cashmere to produce high quality classic
knitwear) characteristics were simultaneously used by top
managers of these firms to delimit the relevant set of
competitors. For Scottish producers, this constellation of
characteristics defines a firm as a member of the Scottish
knitwear competitive group.
Second, Proposition IV implies that decision-makers will
tend to downplay and perhaps even ignore "interspecies"
competition, even when such competition exists. Competition
between two types of organizations is present when the growth
rate of one group negatively influences the growth rate of the
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other (Hannan & Freeman, 1988). Salancik (Note 1), for example,
observed that the rise of "fast food restaurants" in a small
midwestern U.S. town was associated with a decline in the number
of "snack bars." Hannan and Freeman (1988) note that such
interspecies competition is often indirect and not readily
apparent. In such cases, the tendency of strategists to orient
toward organizations perceived as being in the same category as
the focal organization should result in less intensive
interspecies competitive comparisons. Cognitive taxonomies
orient managers to similar rather than dissimilar sources of
rivalry. Of course, exceptions will exist, particularly in cases
where significant environmental scanning resources can be brought
to bear upon the problem of monitoring the competition. For
example, McDonald's Corporation has recently begun to consider
the impact on their core fast food business of microwave
children's meals being marketed by packaged food companies (Key,
1989). In this case, a large sophisticated organization is
monitoring a competitive threat that is perceived to be outside
of the focal organization's business type. Presumably, this is
because of a well-understood definition of rivals as companies
who sell quickly prepared foods to growing families. f
A final issue raised by Proposition IV is whether all
organizations defined as members of the focal competitive set are +
considered equally strong rivals. Cognitive categorization
theory (Rosen, 1978) would suggest that organizations within the
focal category are perceived as varying in how well they
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represent the central tendencies of the category as a whole. The
non-equivalence of category members would seem to promote dual
pressures in the definition of competition. On the one hand,
category "prototypes" would be those organizations that are most
typical and should act as cognitive reference points around which
competitive definitions are centered. Prototypical organizations
should thus be used more heavily as benchmarks in the formulation
of competitive strategy. On the other hand, there should also be
pressure to consider firms most similar to the focal organization
as strongest rivals, a within-category extension of Proposition
IV' s claim that competitive scanning is biased toward similar
others. Thus, for example, within the category "fast food
restaurants" McDonald's should consider Burger King and Wendy's
to be more significant competitive benchmarks than Pizza Hut or
Taco Bell. Under what conditions similarity and prototype
definitions of competitors will be strongest is a matter for
future research.
Proposition V : Changes in competitive definitions can be viewed
as creative recategorizations of the focal organization via
vertical shifts to a different level of perceived abstraction,
horizontal shifts along the sane level, and/or the creation of
new categories altogether .
Competitive comparisons are a result of scanning and
interpreting cues from the interorganizational environment in a
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creative and problem-solving way. The strategist's mental model
can act as both an inhibiting factor in the generation of unique a
approaches to organizing as well as a source of much creative
inspiration. Once a decision-maker has defined the relevant*
competitive category, at whatever taxonomic level, organizational
comparisons are likely to be locked in by the structuring effect
of the category as it has been defined. This structure provides
the foundation upon which much of the environment is understood.
Since new information about changes in the environment is
interpreted from the perspective of a current organizational
definition, a mental model acts as a subtle filtering device
removing anomalous data. A certain degree of cognitive inertia
is to be expected because of the fixation on a particular
competitive boundary at a particular point-in-time.
On the other hand, cognitive taxonomies develop over extended
periods of time and contain much of what is important to know
about a particular interorganizational environment. By actively
using the entire array of conceptual knowledge at his or her
disposal, the strategist can gain creative insights into
alternative forms of organization. The motivation to look beyond
immediately perceived competitive boundaries might come from A
events in the environment, from expert suggestions, or from
personal reflection. When such creative recategorizations do A
occur, however, they are likely to follow one of three
trajectories. First, a decision-maker can shift the definition
of the competitive group to a higher or lower level of
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abstraction, as when a "bank" manager redefines the business as a
"financial services" company, or a "knitwear" manufacturer
reclassifies the business as "high quality knitwear." Second,
competitors can be redefined horizontally, as when an owner of an
"Oriental food store" begins to reconceptualize the business as a
"supermarket." Finally, entirely new conceptual categories can be
invented by creatively recombining the attributes of different
existing organizational forms. For example, a new type of
restaurant category might be defined when attributes of several
existing restaurant types are combined into a single
organization. This sort of creative recombination could very
well be part of the cognitive bases for entrepreneurial
innovations (Hannan & Freeman, 1988).
CONCLUSIONS AND EXTENSIONS
The above arguments are not a complete cognitive theory of
competitive strategy nor even of competitor definition. We have
formulated the five propositions to provide a core cognitive
framework around which additional research and theory must be
developed. As such, our arguments are incomplete in at least
three ways. We have not delt with the case where managerial
categorizations are ill-defined such that cognitive taxonomies
cannot be used in the process of defining and monitoring
organizational rivals. Such might be the case, for example, in
newly emerging or highly volatile environments where stable
categories of organizations are not discoverable by the
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managerial mind. Moreover, we have not delt adequately with the
process of defining competitors and how the use of cognitive g
taxonomies is embedded within more global strategy formulation
activities. Depending upon one's view of managerial judgment and*
decision-making, competitive definition could be viewed as a
relatively rational interorganizational comparison process (e.g.,
Hofer & Schendel, 1978), or as a set of problematic inferences
influenced by "quasi rational" factors such as post hoc
justifications (e.g., Staw, 1980) and "organizational programs"
(e.g., March & Simon, 1958). Our approach is relatively neutral
on this issue, since we are arguing only that strategists attempt
to match the characteristics of their own organization to those
of perceived organizational categories. The specific motivation
for this matching process (i.e., political, organizational,
cultural, etc. ) , and whether the matching is complete or
satisficing, are issues outside the scope of our framework.
Finally, we have not delt with the behavioral consequences of
defining competitors in a particular way. Once an organization
has been defined as a competitor, strategists of the focal
organization have any number of behavioral choices to make
regarding the appropriate means of dealing with the competitive A
threat (e.g., prices, quality, service, acquisition, joint
ventures, new products, etc.). How these choices are made is a
also beyond the scope of our arguments.
Within these limitations, however, a cognitive approach to
competitive definition extends the existing organizational and
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strategy literatures in a number of useful ways. At minimum, a
cognitive approach to competitor definition has implications for
scientific taxonomies of organizational forms. Arguments have
been made in various literatures promoting the classification of
"industries" (e.g., Standard Industrial Classification , 1972),
"product markets," (e.g., Weitz, 1985), "strategic groups"
(Porter, 1980; McGee & Thomas, 1986), and "organizational
species" (McKelvey, 1982). The goal of all such arguments is to
simplify organizational diversity and identify competitive
discontinuities from an "objective" or analytical point-of-view.
Our research departs from this perspective somewhat by suggesting
that it is meaningful to describe competitive boundaries from an
insider's "subjective" point-of-view. At minimum, "cognitive
systematics" is a useful adjunct to more numerically-based
classification procedures (Porac & Thomas, 1987). McKelvey and
Aldrich (1983) noted the difficulty of classifying organizational
forms and suggested that "conventional wisdom" is a necessary
ingredient in isolating groups of organizations to describe. In
this sense, the perceptions of managers operating within an
environment can be used to make tentative first cuts in the
description of organizational populations. Porter (1980) made a
similar point in outlining procedures for identifying intra-
industry strategic groups. A focus upon managerial taxonomies
merely makes systematic the managerial commonsense that has been
previously investigated in a rather ad hoc way.
More interestingly, a cognitive approach raises the
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possibility that managerial definitions of organizational forms
essentially define the most important competitive groups. WeickA
(1979) argued that organizations often create their environments
by constructing interpretations and then acting as if such*
interpretations are true. When extended to the problem of
competitive definition, Weick's argument gives substance to
Robinson's (1956) claim that boundaries among firms might be
important only because they exist in the minds of managers.
Indeed, managerial classification schemes provide the cognitive
foundation for the mutual awareness discussed by White (1981) as
inherent in competitive interactions. Thus, for example, when a
group of managers define their businesses as "clothing stores" or
"supermarkets" their understanding of the competitive environment
is crystallized within a mental model, and their competitive
focus is slanted toward organizations they perceive as members of
the same competitive set. It is easy to see how such perceptions
might eventually become objectified and institutionalized through
such devices as trade associations, specialized publications, and
a particularistic language for describing local ecological
conditions. In the philospher Wittgenstein's (1958) terms,
"industries," "strategic groups," and so forth might be language^
games in which participants enact mental models specifying who
should be watching whom. In this view, competitive groups arei
more than the analytical and economic abstractions of
researchers; they represent the social psychological reality for
member organizations. If this subjectivist perspective holds, it
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will be impossible to classify and understand organizational
forms, at least at the micro-niche level, without describing the
mental models which motivate mutually adjustive competitive
activities
.
Porac et
.
al.'s (1989) study of Scottish knitwear producers
illustrates the basic features of competitive enactment.
According to these researchers, this group of 17 firms in and
around Scotland accounts for only 3* of total world-wide
production of knitted outerwear. Producers from Italy, the Far
East, the U.S., and even others within the UK far outstrip the
Scots in total output. However, when asked to define their
competitors, top executives of Scottish firms typically cite only
the other Scottish firms in the group. According to Porac et
.
al., this narrow competitive definition has focused the attention
of strategists inward in an effort to find ways of competing
among essentially similar Scottish companies. A generic "recipe"
(Huff, 1982) seems to have emerged for such competition: buy
yarn from local spinners, manufacture expensive cashmere sweaters
in classic designs that will appeal to high income consumers, and
sell to exclusive specialty shops and department stores through
commissioned agents around the world. This generic strategy,
coupled with norms against price competition, has limited the
range of strategic possibilities for individual firms within the
group. According to Porac et. al., firms attempt to
differentiate themselves only by offering subtle variations in
color and design within the classic motif. More radical
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departures in strategy, such as using innovative fibers, colors,
fashion designs, and marketing arrangements are typically not fl
considered by Scottish managers, and if they are considered, are
frowned upon. The Scottish case illustrates how a well-developedf
mental model of the competition can become intertwined with
strategic choices in the marketplace to influence the material
conditions of rivalry within a group of organizations. A similar
case has been discussed by Yates (1984) in a study of the U.S.
automobile industry and its "Detroit mind."
Competitive enactment has important implications for
traditional arguments relating market structure to competitive
interdependence. In industrial economic theory, market structure
is seen to range from pure competition, where many small firms
with low market power struggle for survival, to pure monopoly,
where a single firm dominates as the sole supplier of goods or
services (Scherer, 1980). The mutual awareness characterizing
competitive enactment is typically considered a feature of
oligopolistic environments where moderate degrees of
concentration lead to organizations being strategically
interdependent (Pennings, 1981). A cognitive approach, however,
suggests that even in relatively atomistic environments!
strategists construct a subjective reality of cognitive
oligopolies to make sense of local competitive conditions. We |
have suggested that such cognitive activity stems from the press
to simplify interorganizational comparisons. Many theorists have
argued that organizations attempt to reduce or absorb
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environmental uncertainty (e.g., Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978;
Thompson, 1967). The use of mental models to impose order upon
volatile competitive conditions is one way uncertainty can be
reduced. Festinger (1954) argued thirty years ago that
individuals will use similar others to obtain information about
the validity of opinions, capabilities, and behaviors when
objective benchmarks are unavailable. A cognitive taxonomy,
creating an oligopolistic subjective reality, allows strategists
to compare the focal organization to similar others, thereby
obtaining useful information about the organization's strengths
and weaknesses
.
The structuring effect of a mental model raises questions
about the ability of strategists to reconceptualize their
competitive environment when patterns of interorganizational
relationships change. Freeman and Hannan (1983) have argued that
competition is a mediating link between environmental change and
organizational performance. When environmental contingencies
shift, new forms of competition emerge to challenge an
organization's once protected position. In such circumstances,
successful adaptation would seem to require that decision-makers
redefine competitive groups accordingly. However, Hannan and
Freeman (1977; 1988) have argued that inertial forces often
prevent an organization from adapting in this way. It would seem
that one important source of inflexibility is the cognitive
inertia that stems from the presence of a well-formed cognitive
taxonomy. Anecdotal evidence for such inertia abounds in the
38
literature. For example, managers of Atlantic and Pacific Tea
Company seemingly failed to reconceptualize their "food business"!
to counter the actions of competitors who had begun to sell non-
food items with higher profit margins (Astley, 1984). Similarly,
#
Levitt's (1975) well-known discussion of U.S. railroads suggests
that railroad executives might have averted decline by redefining
their businesses as "transportation companies." One might
speculate that such competitive blind spots were induced by
anachronistic mental models framing an environment that no longer
existed.
Finally, our approach adds to the literature on managerial
cognition. Given the increased attention to managerial
interpretations of environments (e.g., Daft & Weick, 1984;
Smircich & Stubbart, 1985; Sims & Gioia, 1986), a number of
attempts have been made to ascertain the nature of managerial
cognitive structures. Most of the discussion has centered upon
the characteristics and influence of "causal maps" (e.g., Bougon,
Weick, & Binkhorst, 1977; Ford & Hegarty, 1981; Salancik & Porac,
1986; Stubbart & Ramaprasad, 1987). While useful, cause maps
represent only one form of cognitive structure, and a taxonomic
approach to mental models is somewhat promising because it adds I
another dimension to research and theory concerning the
managerial understanding of environmental phenomena. This is £
especially the case because established methods exist within
various cognitive sciences for uncovering taxonomic cognitive
structures (e.g., Kempton, 1981; Mervis & Rosch, 1981). Although
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we have stressed the role that such structures play in the
definition of competitive boundaries, there is no reason to limit
the study of taxonomic mental models to only this particular
concern. In an important development, for example, Dutton and
Jackson (1987) have used a categorization approach to understand
the labeling of strategic issues. Hopefully, a greater
understanding of managerial classification will result from such
efforts
.
Figure 1
Cognitive Taxonomy of Computer Programming
Experts for Algorithms and Data Structures
(from Adelson, 1985)
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